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Laws Apply at Sea, Supreme Court Rules was the Washington Post
headline1 for a story reporting the Supreme Court’s November 13, 1922
decision of United States v. Bowman.2 In 1922, America had not yet
imagined a globalized world where a local Washington D.C. phone call
might be answered in New Delhi and where the notion of Americans
making clothes and forging steel was becoming quaint and antiquated.
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1. Laws Apply at Sea, Supreme Court Rules, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1922, at 5.
2. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
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Yet in the Bowman decision, the Court laid the groundwork for a
twenty-first century defined by global commerce and crime without
borders. Today, the Bowman decision receives relatively little attention.
When it is cited, it is often misread by lower courts.3 But as this new
century unfolds, Bowman is likely to be seen as a central decision in the
evolution of international criminal jurisdiction. It is time to shine a new
light on Bowman—a criminal procedure decision that has long been
underrated and misunderstood.
In Part I of this Article, we provide a description of the facts and
holding of United States v. Bowman. In Part II, we describe the ways in
which lower courts have interpreted this decision. We point to various
cases citing Bowman and show how these courts give exceedingly broad
application to the holding—far broader application than the opinion
warrants. Finally, in Part III, we discuss the ways in which the courts
should read Bowman and demonstrate how this more accurate reading of
the Court’s decision is consistent with the realities of twenty-first
century global economies. In doing so, we illustrate how Bowman
can be a leading case for a sensible international criminal jurisdiction
jurisprudence in a global age.
I.

THE BOWMAN DECISION

Raymond Bowman was the chief engineer of the vessel Dio, a ship
owned by the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation
(the Fleet Corporation) and operated by the National Shipping Corporation.4
The United States owned all of the stock in the Fleet Corporation.5 The
National Shipping Corporation was to bill the Fleet Corporation for fuel,
oil, labor, and material necessary to operate the Dio.6 Bowman was accused
of working with three other codefendants to defraud the Fleet Corporation.
The indictment stated that these defendants hatched a plan to have the
National Shipping Corporation bill the Fleet Corporation for one
thousand tons of oil, while only taking delivery of six hundred tons. The
four defendants would then divide the excess cash produced by this
overbilling.7

3.
4.
(No. 69).
5.
6.
7.
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Bowman, 260 U.S. at 95–96.
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The United States government charged four defendants, including
Raymond H. Bowman, with conspiracy to defraud8 the “United States
Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, a corporation in which
the United States was a stockholder.”9 Three of the defendants, including
Bowman, were United States citizens and the fourth was a British subject.
The indictment was filed in the Southern District of New York, the
district in which the Americans were first brought.10 The charges in the
indictment specified that the acts occurred in several different locations,
including on the high seas, at the port of Rio Janeiro, in the city of Rio
Janeiro, and in its harbor.11 One defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to one day in custody.12 Two other defendants were never tried, one
having his bail forfeited.13 The other, a British citizen, was never arrested.14
Raymond H. Bowman, the remaining defendant, was left to answer the
charges levied against him.
Bowman filed a demurrer to the six-count indictment, arguing that the
court had no jurisdiction.15 The lower court sustained the demurrer stating
that “[o]rdinarily . . . and prima facie, the criminal laws of the United
States are effective only within the territory of the United States.”16 The
district court emphasized that congressional language is necessary to
extend “the locus of the crime to the high seas or beyond the territory of
the United States,” and Congress did not include such language.17
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and adopted
the government’s position that extraterritorial jurisdiction was authorized.18
The Court began its analysis by conceding that, absent explicit language
8. The first three counts of the six count indictment charged conspiracy to
defraud. The fourth count was for a fictitious claim, count five for the presentation of
that claim, and the final count for “concealment by trick, scheme, and device of a
material fact in the presentation of the claim.” Brief for the United States, supra note 4,
at 4.
9. Id. at 1.
10. See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 96.
11. Id.
12. Transcript of Record at 22, Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (No. 69).
13. Brief for the United States, supra note 4, at 2.
14. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 102.
15. Brief for the United States, supra note 4, at 5.
16. United States v. Bowman, 287 F. 588, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), rev’d, 260 U.S.
94 (1922).
17. Id. at 593 (emphasis added). The lower court stated that “the court and not
Congress would be writing the statute, if it gave to it the construction urged by the
Government.” Id.
18. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 102–03.
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to the contrary, “[c]rimes against private individuals or their property,
like assaults, murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, arson, embezzlement
and frauds of all kinds, which affect the peace and good order of the
community, must of course be committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of the government where it may properly exercise it.”19 But the Court
permitted extraterritorial jurisdiction in Bowman because:
[T]he same rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal statutes which
are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Government’s
jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government to defend
itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed
by its own citizens, officers, or agents.20

And individuals who commit “fraud upon the government” should be
prosecuted irrespective of whether it is “in private and public vessels of
the United States on the high seas and in foreign ports and beyond the
land jurisdiction of the United States.”21 The Court limited its holding to
some degree, emphasizing the importance of Bowman’s status as a
United States citizen.22
The Court thus staked out a position rejecting broad extraterritorial
application of criminal law in the absence of express congressional mandate.23
The distinction, which is apparent from a close reading of this case, is
between acts that affect private citizens and those acts targeted directly
against the government.24 Although society may typically view criminal
law as a means to regulate conduct that damages public welfare, the
facts of Bowman—and the Court’s narrow analysis of the case—clearly
address criminal behavior for which the government is the prime
victim.25 The Court also clearly showed its respect for the rule of
comity,26 which dictates that the United States should not interfere with

19. Id. at 98.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 102.
22. See id. The Court stated that “the three defendants . . . were citizens of the
United States, and were certainly subject to such laws as it might pass . . . . The other
defendant is a subject of Great Britain . . . . and it will be time enough to consider what,
if any, jurisdiction the District Court below has to punish him when he is brought to
trial.” Id. at 102–03.
23. Id. at 98–99, 102.
24. Id. at 98.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 102. The Court stated that “[c]learly it is no offense to the dignity or
right of sovereignty of Brazil to hold them for this crime against the government to
which they owe allegiance.” Id.
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another country’s desire to prosecute alleged criminal conduct occurring
within that country’s jurisdiction.27
This interpretation of Bowman fits with later Supreme Court decisions
that invoke a presumption against extraterritorial application of criminal
statutes unless Congress expresses a contrary intent.28 Although Bowman
was not mentioned in the recent Supreme Court decision of Small v.
United States,29 which held that the meaning of “convicted in any court”
did not include foreign courts,30 the Small Court clearly stated that “Congress
ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial,
application.”31
In later years, however, the legacy of Bowman has not been so clear
cut. Bowman has been an underappreciated decision—it has been cited
fewer than two hundred times in the case law. Where the decision has
been cited, courts often used it to support findings that are inconsistent
with the analysis of the Bowman Court.32
II. THE BOWMAN LEGACY
In the years since Bowman, and particularly in the past forty years, the
federal government has vastly expanded its criminal enforcement
powers.33 Congress has adopted a surfeit of new statutes.34 And
prosecutorial offices, including various Department of Justice divisions,
United States Attorney’s offices, and criminal enforcement divisions in

27. ELLEN S. PODGOR, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 7–8
(2004). For a discussion of the meanings and origins of comity in international law, see
generally Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1991).
28. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993); Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244
(1991), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105
Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)), as recognized in Landgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
29. 544 U.S. 385 (2005).
30. Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 388–89.
32. See, e.g., Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 350 (9th Cir. 1967) (using
Bowman to support a finding of extraterritoriality); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134,
136–37 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying the Bowman Court’s discussion of congressional intent
to support a holding of extraterritoriality).
33. TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIM. LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1998) (noting that “[m]ore than 40% of the federal
criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 1970”).
34. Id. at 7–9.
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other agencies, have expanded to enforce these laws.35 One of the most
important and wide-ranging aspects of this expansion has been in the
area of drug enforcement.36 Because a large portion of the legal drug traffic
starts in, and passes through, other countries, federal drug enforcement
agencies have begun to look outside the country in their efforts to prosecute
drug crimes.37 In more recent years, with the rise of the Internet and, more
generally, a global economy, enforcement of other economic crimes has
pushed beyond the national borders.38
Given this dramatic expansion in both the scope and geographic reach
of federal prosecutions, it was hardly surprising that federal agencies
sought the power to reach defendants outside the country—even in the
absence of explicit congressional authorization for such conduct.
In 1967, in Brulay v. United States,39 the Ninth Circuit considered the
extraterritorial reach of a conspiracy statute where prosecutors charged
the defendant with conspiring to smuggle drugs into the United States.
In Brulay, the American defendant was arrested in Mexico for conduct
that occurred in Mexico.40 The government introduced no evidence that
the conspiracy was formed in the United States and provided no evidence of
an overt act in the United States.41 Summarily dismissing the defendant’s
challenge, the court rejected the argument that there was any need for
express congressional authorization for extraterritorial reach.42 Instead, the
court quoted Bowman’s critical language and argued that conspiracy to
smuggle drugs into the country was the sort of crime “not logically
dependent on their locality for the government’s jurisdiction, but are
enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself against
obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its
own citizens, officers, or agents.”43 The court provided no additional
35. Id. at 14.
36. See U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Staffing & Budget,
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/staffing.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2007) (illustrating
the staffing increases in the Drug Enforcement Administration over the past thirty-four
years).
37. See United States v. Larsen, 952 F.2d 1099, 1100 (9th Cir. 1991) (surveying
the different circuits that gave extraterritorial effect to a particular drug statute). See also
EDWARD M. WISE, ELLEN S. PODGOR & ROGER S. CLARK, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
191–94 (2d ed. 2004).
38. See EDWARD M. WISE & ELLEN S. PODGOR, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
142–43 (2000).
39. 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967).
40. Id. at 347.
41. See id. at 349–51. Although 18 U.S.C. § 371, the generic conspiracy statute,
requires proof of an overt act, drug conspiracy statutes omit this element in the offense,
allowing prosecutors to prove a conspiracy without presenting any evidence of an overt
act coming from the agreement. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11 (1994).
42. Brulay, 383 F.2d at 350.
43. Id. (quoting United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922)).
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analysis and did not explain how a conspiracy to smuggle drugs fit into
the category of crimes involving fraud against the United States.
In United States v. Baker,44 the Fifth Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit’s
logic but offered a more explicit and expansive reading of Bowman. In
Baker, Abraham Baker and James Osborne were convicted of possession
with intent to distribute marijuana.45 The two men had been operating
an American flag vessel nine miles off the coast of Florida, which was
outside the three-mile territorial jurisdiction of the United States.46 The
question before the Fifth Circuit was whether the federal criminal statutes
had extraterritorial application, and the court conceded that the statutes
involved in Baker were silent on this point.47 The court turned to Bowman
to determine whether to infer such extraterritorial reach.48 The Bowman
Court started its analysis with a clear awareness that extraterritorial
application without express authorization would not be the norm.49
Remarkably, the Baker court began its analysis with the claim that
“[a]bsent an express intention on the face of the statutes to do so, the
exercise of [extraterritorial] power may be inferred from the nature of
the offenses and Congress’ other legislative efforts to eliminate the type
of crime involved.”50 The court then quoted extensively from the
Bowman Court’s carefully worded holding.51 Writing for the Fifth Circuit,
Judge Roney explained that the drug laws at issue were part of a
comprehensive effort to halt drug abuse in the United States and “the
power to control efforts to introduce illicit drugs into the United States
from the high seas and foreign nations is a necessary incident to Congress’
efforts to eradicate all illegal drug trafficking.”52 Although the court had
to concede that the statute was silent as to the extraterritorial application

44. 609 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1980).
45. Id. at 136. Baker was also convicted of conspiracy. Id.
46. Id. at 135. The boat was stopped nine miles from the coast, within what are
sometimes known as “customs waters” or the “marginal sea.” The United States
conceded that this area was regarded as outside of the United States—and part of the
high seas—for the purpose of criminal jurisdiction. Id. at 136.
47. Id. at 136.
48. Id. at 136–37.
49. The Bowman Court stated, “If punishment . . . is to be extended to include
those committed outside of the strict territorial jurisdiction, it is natural for Congress to
say so in the statute, and failure to do so will negative the purpose of Congress in this
regard.” United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
50. Baker, 609 F.2d at 136.
51. Id. at 136–37.
52. Id. at 137.
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of the provisions at issue in Baker, it pointed to other sections of the law
where Congress had affirmatively authorized extraterritorial reach. For
instance, the Court referenced 21 U.S.C. § 959, which criminalizes the
manufacturing and distribution of a controlled substance outside the
United States with the intent of importing it to the United States, to
support its position that the exclusion of language providing for express
extraterritorial authorization signified Congress’s intent to include such
broad authorization of power.53
Thus, the Baker court transformed Bowman in three key ways: first,
the court inverted the assumption that extraterritorial application of
criminal law normally required express authorization; second, the court
found such implicit authorization in a situation where Congress clearly
demonstrated its ability to explicitly authorize such power (but equally
clearly failed to do so with respect to the particular statute at issue); and
third, the court joined other courts, such as the Brulay court, in extending
the number of circumstances in which such authorization could implicitly
be found beyond situations where the government itself was a victim to
situations where the statute was designed to protect the public at large.
This expansion of Bowman dramatically changed the meaning of the
opinion and was subsequently the basis for other decisions authorizing a
broader reach of statutes, even in the absence of express congressional
authorization.54
The problem with these interpretations of Bowman, however, is twofold.
First, these interpretations are not faithful to the Supreme Court’s explicit
holding. Second, they are deeply problematic on a policy level, particularly
in an era of globalization where many countries may seek to enforce
their respective interests both at home and abroad.
III. BOWMAN AND THE “NEW WORLD ORDER”
The Supreme Court handed down the Bowman decision in an era very
different from today. Still, the Court’s carefully crafted decision reflects
the same concerns that should animate a modern understanding of the
issue of extraterritorial reach. The primary difference between the 1920s
and today is that the world has become far more interconnected than ever
before. We are living, in the words of President George H.W. Bush, in a
“new world order.”55

53. Id.
54. See United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (listing
cases that have allowed an extraterritorial application).
55. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the Persian Gulf War Crisis and
the Federal Budget Deficit, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1218, 1219 (Sept. 11, 1990).
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In the past forty years, many courts have inferred broad reach to
criminal laws even in the absence of Congressional mandate.56 There is
little doubt that Congress maintains the capacity to create such potent
laws. But because the consequences of these provisions are increasingly
far reaching—with many countries potentially seeking to extend the
reach of their criminal laws and possibly willing to punish America for
an extended reach—Congress should make these judgments.
The issues are not simple and two policy rationales conflict here. On
one hand there is a need to make certain that individuals do not cross
borders merely to avoid criminal prosecution in the United States. For
example, a Washington Post article reporting on the Bowman decision
stated that the Court upheld the government’s position “that unless the
ruling of the lower court was set aside the criminal statutes of the United
States could be violated with impunity by persons going outside the 3mile limit.”57 Allowing perpetrators to intentionally exit the borders of
this country to commit crimes against individuals here would defeat the
prohibitions outlined in the statute.
On the other hand, another policy rationale argues for limits to
extraterritorial applications. If the United States begins prosecuting
individuals outside its borders because the crime merely “affects” this
country,58 it will be advertising to other countries that they can prosecute
United States citizens when the conduct has an effect on their respective
country.59 Taking into account that the crimes in these other countries
may not be crimes in the United States or may be subject to our
constitutional protections, it becomes apparent that there are severe
repercussions in allowing blanket extraterritoriality. Finally, in this globalized
and computerized world, the United States citizen who commits the
alleged criminal act in violation of the laws of another country may
never have left home.60 The perpetrator’s keystroke in the United States,
56. See Plummer, 221 F.3d at 1305 (listing cases that have allowed an extraterritorial
application).
57. Laws Apply at Sea, supra note 1, at 5.
58. This principle is called “objective territoriality.” See Strassheim v. Daily, 221
U.S. 280, 285 (1911); see also Aldens, Inc. v. La Follette, 552 F.2d 745, 751 (7th Cir.
1977).
59. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Replacing
“Objective Territoriality” With “Defensive Territoriality,” in 28 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS &
SOCIETY 117 (Austin Sarat & Patricia Ewick eds., 2003) (discussing the repercussions of
expansive extraterritorial jurisdiction).
60. Former Attorney General Janet Reno stated that “[a] hacker needs no passport
and passes no checkpoints.” Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney Gen., Keynote Address at the
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expressing speech that the First Amendment protects, may nevertheless
be the subject of a prosecution in a country with laws prohibiting such
speech.61 Jurisdiction would be basically limitless if it could be met
merely because the World Wide Web allows someone in another country
to access via their computer materials that have been placed on the web
in this country.
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces—
perhaps not surprisingly a tribunal likely to express grave concern
regarding the international implications of its decisions—confronted this
problematic legacy of Bowman. In United States v. Martinelli,62 the court
considered the extraterritorial reach of the Child Pornography Prevention
Act of 1996. Christopher Martinelli, a member of the United States
military, had been charged with violations of the Act that occurred in
Darmstadt, Germany.63 He was accused of possessing, downloading,
and emailing pornographic images of children on his computer.64 The
court acknowledged that several courts had read Bowman to extend
beyond cases where the American government was a victim.65 The court
rejected this interpretation, however, concluding that while the Act was
designed to protect children, this community protection was not the
sort that the Bowman Court considered as a basis for inferring the
extraterritorial reach of a criminal statute.66

Meeting of the P8 Senior Experts’ Group on Transnational Organized Crime (Jan. 21,
1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/agfranc.htm. One of the
President’s working groups repeated this metaphor in its report on cybercrime.
PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON THE INTERNET, THE ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE OF THE
INTERNET 21 (2000), available at http://www/usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm.
61. See German and U.S. Clash Over Efforts to Crack Down on Neo-Nazi Web
Sites in the U.S., 17 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 63, 64 (2001) (discussing controversy
between United States and Germany in that Germany wishes to “crack down extraterritorially
on Neo-Nazi hate crimes,” and United States wishes to maintain individuals’ First
Amendment rights within United States); see also Yahoo!, Inc., v. La Ligue Contre Le
Racisme Et L’Antisenitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (ruling that
Yahoo! was not subject to French laws criminalizing the auctioning of Nazi memorabilia
when the conduct was protected by the First Amendment), cited in Ellen S. Podgor,
International Computer Fraud: A Paradigm for Limiting National Jurisdiction, 35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 267, 310 n.179 (2002).
62. 62 M.J. 52 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
63. Id. at 53.
64. Id. at 55.
65. Id. at 58.
66. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Bowman provides a key distinction that few courts recognize today.67
If the government is the target or the victim of a criminal act, extraterritorial
jurisdiction should be permitted. Conversely, if the target or the victim
of the crime is beyond the government, then courts should refuse to
permit the government to prosecute absent clear congressional language
authorizing an extraterritorial application. The government’s brief in the
Bowman case clearly limits its request for relief to this scenario, as the
authors of the brief use italics as emphasis in describing crimes as “not
against persons and property but against the sovereignty of the United
States and the operations of its Government.”68
So why should this case be deemed the most underrated criminal procedure
case? Jurisdiction is the most fundamental principle for proceeding with
a criminal action. Without the power to investigate, prosecute, and punish
activities, there is no criminal matter before the court. There will be no
forum to resolve Miranda,69 Escobedo,70 or Leon71 issues if the court
never assumes jurisdiction of the case.
The Bowman case provides an important paradigm for determining the
appropriate geographic boundaries for criminal matters. It also stands at
the entry way, the place where the criminal justice process begins. Although
many statutes will specify the constitutional basis for jurisdiction, many
will omit whether extraterritorial actions are legally permissible, leaving
the courts with the task of wrestling with this question. Historically,
answering this question may not have been crucial. But when criminal
activities move from the seas to the internet highway, jurisdiction may
prove to be the most crucial issue that courts will need to resolve.

67. The misreading of the statute can be traced back to a Fifth Circuit decision,
United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980). See Martinelli, 62 M.J. at 58
(discussing how the roots of the misreading of the Bowman decision emanate from this
drug-related case).
68. Brief for the United States, supra note 4, at 17.
69. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating procedure by which police
must apprise criminal suspects of their rights and thereby mitigate interrogation’s
inherent element of coercion).
70. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (defining circumstances where a
criminal suspect can be in police custody without being under formal arrest).
71. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (creating exception to evidentiary
exclusionary rule where police make good-faith attempt to follow constitutionally required
procedures).
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